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Abstract
A number of studies have identied patterns of positive correlation of returns, or
comovement, among dierent traded securities. We distinguish three views of such co-
movement. The traditional \fundamentals" view explains the comovement of securities
through positive correlations in the rational determinants of their values, such as cash
ows or discount rates. \Category-based" comovement occurs when investors classify
dierent securities into the same asset class and shift resources in and out of this class
in correlated ways. A related phenomenon of \habitat-based" comovement arises when
a group of investors restricts its trading to a given set of securities, and moves in and
out of that set in tandem.
We present models of each of the three types of comovement, and then assess them
empirically using data on stock inclusions into and deletions from the S&P 500 index.
Index changes are noteworthy because they change a stock's category and investor
clientele (habitat), but do not change its fundamentals. We nd that when a stock is
added to the index, its beta and R-squared with respect to the index increase, while its
beta with respect to stocks outside the index falls. The converse happens when a stock
is deleted. These results are broadly supportive of the category and habitat views of
comovement, but not of the fundamentals view. More generally, we argue that these
non-traditional views may help explain other instances of comovement in the data.

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1 Introduction
Researchers studying the structure of asset returns have uncovered numerous patterns of
comovement. There is a strong common factor in the returns of small-cap stocks, for example,
and also in the returns of value stocks, closed-end funds, stocks in the same industry, and
bonds of the same rating and maturity. There is common movement within national markets
and across international markets.
Common factors such as these have attracted considerable attention because of the pos-
sible role they play in explaining average rates of return. However, little work has been done
on understanding why the common factors arise in the rst place. Why do certain groups of
assets comove while others do not? What determines loadings, or betas, on these common
factors? In this paper, we consider three theories of comovement { one traditional, two more
novel { and present new evidence in support of the non-traditional theories.
The traditional view is that comovement in prices reects comovement in fundamental
values. This follows as a direct corollary of the eÆcient markets hypothesis. Since, under that
hypothesis, prices equal fundamental value { in other words, the sum of an asset's rationally
forecasted cash ows, discounted at a rate appropriate for their risk { any comovement in
prices must be due to comovement in fundamentals.
An asset's fundamental value can change either because of news about cash ows or
because of news about discount rates. Under the traditional view, then, correlation in returns
is either due to correlation in cash ow news or to correlation in news about discount rates.
Correlation in discount rate news can in turn arise because of news about interest rates or
risk aversion, which aects all discount rates simultaneously, or because of correlated news
about asset riskiness. There is little doubt that this \fundamentals" view of comovement
explains many instances of common factors in returns: stocks in the oil industry move
together because there is a common component in news about their future earnings, while
the market factor in stock returns is at least in part due to changes in interest rates.
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A number of recent papers, however, present evidence suggesting that the traditional
view of comovement is incomplete. Froot and Dabora (1999) study Siamese-twin stocks,
which are claims to the same cash ow stream, but are traded in dierent locations. Royal
Dutch, traded primarily in the U.S., and Shell, traded primarily in the U.K., are perhaps
the best known example. If return comovement is purely a reection of comovement in news
about fundamentals, these two stocks should be perfectly correlated. In fact, as Froot and
Dabora show, Royal Dutch comoves more with the S&P 500 index of U.S. stocks than Shell
1
The ndings of Shiller (1989) illustrate the importance of accounting for changes in discount rates when
examining patterns of comovement. He shows that the U.S. and U.K. stock markets comove more than can
be explained by correlation in news about dividends alone; however, he also shows that allowing for plausible
changes in discount rates can potentially explain the residual comovement.
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does, while Shell comoves more with the FTSE index of U.K. stocks.
Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994) and Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995) uncover
related evidence in their studies of closed-end country funds, whose assets trade in a dierent
location from the funds themselves. Since funds and their underlying assets represent claims
to similar cash ow streams, the fundamentals view of comovement predicts that fund returns
and returns on their net assets values should be highly correlated. In fact, closed-end country
funds comove much more with the national stock market in the country where they are
traded than with the national stock market in the country where their assets are traded.
For example, a closed-end fund invested in German equities but traded in the U.S. typically
comoves more with the U.S. stock market than with the German stock market.
Fama and French (1995) investigate whether the strong common factors detected in
the returns of value stocks and small stocks by Fama and French (1993) can be traced to
common factors in the earnings of these stocks. While they do uncover a common factor in
the earnings of small stocks, as well as in the earnings of value stocks, these cash ow factors
are weaker than the factors in returns and there is little evidence that the return factors are
driven by the cash ow factors. Once again, there appears to be comovement in returns that
has little to do with comovement in news about fundamentals.
Finally, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) nd strong comovement in the prices of seven
commodities { wheat, cotton, copper, gold, crude oil, lumber, and cocoa { that are chosen to
be as independent of one another as possible. They are neither complements nor substitutes,
are grown in dierent climates and are used for dierent purposes. Under the traditional
view of comovement, the only plausible source of price correlation is news about aggregate
demand. However, even after experimenting with a variety of forecasting models, Pindyck
and Rotemberg are unable to nd suÆcient volatility in news about aggregate demand to
fully explain the comovement.
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These examples suggest that investor trading patterns, and not just fundamentals, may
be important determinants of return comovement. In this paper, we consider two specic
versions of such trading-induced comovement. The rst version, which we label the \cat-
egory" view of comovement, was recently analyzed by Barberis and Shleifer (2000). They
argue that when making portfolio decisions, many investors rst group assets into categories
such as small-cap stocks, oil industry stocks, or junk bonds, and then allocate funds across
these various categories. If some of the investors who use categories are noise traders with
correlated sentiment, and if their trading aects prices, then as they move funds from one
2
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) uncover similar evidence in an analogous study of stock returns. They
construct groups of stocks that are in completely dierent lines of business and nd that even though
the stocks within each group are in dierent industries, their returns still comove strongly. This \excess"
comovement remains even after controlling for any cash ow or discount rate correlation induced by news
about future macroeconomic conditions.
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category to another, their coordinated demand will induce common factors in the returns of
assets that happen to be classied into the same category, even if these assets' cash ows
are largely uncorrelated.
Another type of trading-induced comovement, which we refer to as the \habitat" view of
comovement, starts from the observation that many investors choose to trade only a subset
of all available securities. Such preferred habitats may arise because of transaction costs,
international trading restrictions, or lack of information (Merton, 1987). As these investors'
risk aversion or sentiment changes, they alter their exposure to the securities in their habitat,
thereby inducing a common factor in the returns of these securities. In other words, this
view of comovement predicts that there will be a common factor in the returns of securities
that are the primary holdings of a specic subset of investors, such as individual investors.
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Trading-induced comovement is a simple way of understanding the empirical evidence
described above. If small-cap stocks and value stocks form natural categories in investors'
minds { and the large number of money managers and mutual funds focused on such stocks
suggests that they do { then the category view of comovement predicts that there will
be common factors in the returns of such stocks even if their cash ows are only weakly
correlated. Moreover, if many individual investors in the U.S. conne themselves to holding
domestically traded securities, then the habitat view of comovement predicts that closed-
end country funds traded in the U.S. will comove substantially with U.S. stocks even if their
holdings consist of foreign equities.
The idea that trading unrelated to news about fundamental value might generate co-
movement builds on earlier evidence that such trading aects prices. Some of the best-known
evidence of this type comes from stock index redenitions. When an index is redened, in-
vestors who follow it must reduce their holdings of securities that have been downweighted
in the index and buy those whose weighting has increased. Under the eÆcient markets view,
these demand shifts should not aect prices, as they carry no information about fundamental
value. However, Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997)
nd strong price eects for S&P 500 inclusions, while Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (1999) and
Greenwood (2001) nd similar eects in the Toronto Stock Exchange TSE 300 and Nikkei
225 indices, respectively.
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In this paper, we return to the S&P 500 inclusion and deletion data. The same data that
has proved useful in showing that uninformed demand can aect prices may also be helpful
3
Other models which consider investor habitats are motivated by similar information and transaction
cost considerations as our own, but focus on dierent issues. Merton (1987) analyses the cross-sectional
implications when investors apply standard mean-variance analysis, but only over a subset of available
assets. Our focus is on the eects of habitat-level demand shifts that aect all stocks in the habitat equally.
4
Numerous other papers present evidence consistent with uninformed demand aecting prices. These
include French and Roll (1986), Lamont and Thaler (2000), Goetzmann and Massa (2001), Gompers and
Metrick (2001), and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Staord (2002).
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in showing that such demand can generate comovement. Since addition to the S&P 500
does not aect fundamental value, a stock's inclusion does not change the correlation of its
cash ows with the cash ows of other stocks already in the index. Under the fundamentals
view of comovement, then, it should not change the correlation of the stock's return with
the return of the S&P. In particular, a univariate regression of a stock's return on the S&P
return both before and after the stock's inclusion should produce similar slope coeÆcients,
or S&P betas, and similar R
2
s.
On the other hand, the vast popularity of S&P-linked investment products suggests that
the index is a preferred habitat for some investors, and is viewed as a natural category by
many more. Category-based investors include investors pursuing passive portfolio strategies
through index funds as well as index arbitrageurs exploiting discrepancies between cash and
futures prices. The trading-based theories may therefore dier from the fundamentals view
in their predictions about patterns of comovement before and after a stock's inclusion. In
particular, simple models of the category and habitat views predict that in the univariate
regression described above, the S&P beta and R
2
should increase after inclusion; that in a
bivariate regression of a stock's return on both the S&P and a non-S&P 500 \rest of the
market" index, the S&P beta should rise after the stock's inclusion while the non-S&P beta
should fall; that these patterns should go in the opposite direction for deletions; and that
there should be a decrease in the correlation between S&P and non-S&P returns over time,
to the extent that the S&P becomes more widely used as a category or habitat.
Our evidence supports the trading-based theories. Over a range of data frequencies,
stocks added to the S&P increase their beta and R
2
with the S&P, while in bivariate regres-
sions that control for non-S&P returns, increases in S&P beta are even more pronounced.
Signicant results in the opposite direction are observed when stocks are deleted from the
index. We also conrm a signicant decrease in the correlation of S&P and non-S&P returns
over time.
Our univariate regression results t well with the evidence of Vijh (1994), who investigates
whether the rise of S&P-linked products aects stocks' beta with respect to the overall
market. He nds a signicant increase in stocks' betas after inclusion, which is consistent
with the increase in S&P beta we detect, given the dominant contribution of S&P stocks to
the value-weighted market return.
In Section 2, we present some simple models illustrating the various views of comovement,
as well as their distinct predictions. In Section 3, we test a number of these predictions using
data on S&P 500 inclusions and deletions. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Three Models of Comovement
In this section, we lay out three theories of return comovement. Our models are simple,
but they nevertheless allow us to illustrate the predictions of each theory. These predictions
motivate the empirical work in Section 3.
In all three models, the economy contains a riskless asset in perfectly elastic supply and
with a zero rate of return, and also 2n risky assets in xed supply. Risky asset i is a claim
to a single liquidating dividend D
i;T
to be paid at some later time T . The eventual dividend
equals
D
i;T
= D
i;0
+ "
i;1
+ : : :+ "
i;T
; (1)
where "
i;t
becomes known at time t, and where
"
t
= ("
1;t
; : : : ; "
2n;t
)
0
 N(0;
D
); i.i.d over time.
For simplicity, we impose a one-factor structure on the cash ow shocks:
"
i;t
=  
M
f
M;t+1
+
q
1   
2
M
f
i;t+1
; 8i; (2)
where f
M;t+1
is a market-wide factor and ff
i;t+1
g
i=1;:::;2n
are idiosyncratic shocks. The fac-
tors are all distributed N(0; 1), i.i.d. over time, and are orthogonal to one another. This
immediately implies
(
D
)
ij
 cov("
i;t+1
; "
j;t+1
) =
(
1, i = j
 
2
M
, i 6= j
: (3)
We use P
l;t
to denote the price of a share of risky asset l at time t. The asset's return between
time t  1 and time t is
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P
l;t
 P
l;t
  P
l;t 1
. (4)
2.1 Fundamentals-based Comovement
Under the fundamentals view, comovement in returns is due to comovement in news about
fundamental value. This prediction emerges from a wide range of models. We present a
simple example below.
The economy contains a large number of identical agents known as \fundamental traders."
These traders are given an amount W
F
to allocate at the start of each period. They have
5
For simplicity, we refer to the asset's change in price as its return.
6
CARA utility dened over the value of their invested wealth one period later, and take price
changes to be normally distributed.
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They therefore solve
max
N
t
E
F
t
(  exp[ (W
F
+N
t
0
(P
t+1
  P
t
))]); (5)
where
P
t
= (P
1;t
; : : : ; P
2n;t
)
0
N
t
= (N
1;t
; : : : ; N
2n;t
)
0
:
N
i;t
is the number of shares allocated to risky asset i,  governs the degree of risk aversion
and E
F
t
denotes fundamental trader expectations at time t.
Optimal holdings N
F
t
are given by
N
F
t
=
(V
F
t
)
 1

(E
F
t
(P
t+1
)  P
t
); (6)
where
V
F
t
 var
F
t
(P
t+1
  P
t
);
with the F superscript in var
F
t
again denoting a forecast made by fundamental traders.
If the total supply of the 2n assets is given by the vector Q, then given fundamental
trader expectations about future prices, current prices satisfy
P
t
= E
F
t
(P
t+1
)  V
F
t
Q: (7)
Rolling this equation forward and setting
E
F
T 1
(P
T
) = E
F
T 1
(D
T
) = D
T 1
,
where
D
t
= (D
1;t
; : : : ; D
2n;t
)
0
;
leads to
P
t
= D
t
  V
F
t
Q  E
F
t
T t 1
X
k=1
V
F
t+k
Q: (8)
If fundamental traders set
V
F
t
= 
D
, 8t; (9)
equation (8) reduces to
P
t
= D
t
  (T   t)
D
Q: (10)
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This assumption is conrmed in equilibrium.
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This means that up to a constant
P
t+1
= D
t+1
= "
t+1
, (11)
conrming fundamental traders' conjecture about the conditional covariance matrix of re-
turns.
Equation (11) shows that in this economy, return comovement simply reects comovement
in news about fundamental value. More specically, since discount rates are constant, it
reects comovement in news about future cash ows.
7
This is surely a useful model for
understanding many instances of common factors in returns. The strong market and industry
factors in returns, for example, are at least in part due to market-level and industry-level
factors in cash ow news.
2.2 Category-based Comovement
Barberis and Shleifer (2000) argue that when making their portfolio decisions, many investors
rst group assets into categories based on some characteristic, and then allocate funds at
the level of these categories rather than at the level of individual securities. Thinking about
investments in terms of categories is particularly attractive to institutional investors who,
as duciaries, must follow systematic rules in their portfolio allocation. Investing by cate-
gory simplies the investment process, and also provides a consistent way of evaluating the
performance of money managers.
In order to test any predictions that emerge from a category-based model, it is important
to have a concrete way of identifying categories. One way to do this is to look at the
labels mutual and pension fund managers use to describe their products to clients. If money
managers are responsive to client needs, they will choose labels that correspond to the
categories people like to use when thinking about investments. For example, since many
money managers oer funds that invest in value stocks, \value stocks" may be a category in
the minds of many investors. This way of thinking suggests that Treasury bonds, junk bonds,
large stocks, small stocks, growth stocks, or stocks within a particular industry, country, or
index are also all examples of categories.
The category view of comovement argues that some of the investors who use categories
are noise traders with correlated sentiment. As their sentiment changes, they channel funds
in and out of the various categories. If these fund ows aect prices, they will generate
common factors in the returns of assets that happen to be classied into the same category,
even if these assets' fundamental values are uncorrelated. For example, if \value stocks" is
7
Discount rates are constant because the riskless rate is constant, as are investors' risk aversion and their
perception of risk.
8
a popular category, then as noise traders move funds in and out of value stocks in line with
their changing sentiment about value stocks, they will create a common factor in value stock
returns even if value stock earnings are completely uncorrelated.
To see this in a formal model, suppose that there are just two such categories, X and
Y , and that risky assets 1 through n are in category X while assets n + 1 through 2n are
in Y . It may be helpful to think of X and Y as \old economy" and \new economy" stocks,
respectively. We write noise trader demand N
C
i;t
for shares of asset i as
8
N
C
i;t
=
1
n
[A
X
+ u
1;t
] ; iX (12)
N
C
j;t
=
1
n
[A
Y
+ u
2;t
] ; jY ,
where A
X
and A
Y
are constants, and where the time t sentiment shocks u
1;t
and u
2;t
are
distributed
 
u
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u
2;t
!
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0
0
!
; 
2
u
 
1 
u

u
1
!!
; i.i.d. over time.
The fact that the demand for all assets within a category is the same underscores the fact
that these investors allocate funds at the category level and do not distinguish among assets
in the same category.
This economy also contains fundamental traders whose objective function is the one in
(5). In this case, they double up as market makers, treating the noise trader demand as a
supply shock. Given their expectations about future prices, current prices are given by
P
t
= E
F
t
(P
t+1
)  V
F
t
(Q N
C
t
); (13)
where
N
C
t
= (N
C
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; : : : ; N
C
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)
0
:
Rolling this equation forward, and setting E
F
T 1
(P
T
) = D
T 1
, leads to
P
t
= D
t
  V
F
t
(Q N
C
t
)  E
F
t
T t 1
X
k=1
V
F
t+k
(Q N
C
t+k
): (14)
Suppose that fundamental traders conjecture that the conditional covariance matrix of
returns has the form
V
F
t
= V = 
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The \C" superscript stands for Category.
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for some 
2
, 
1
, and 
2
.
Given this conjecture,
P
t
= D
t
  V (Q N
C
t
)  (T   t  1)V (Q  A); (16)
where
A = (
A
X
n
; : : : ;
A
X
n
;
A
Y
n
; : : : ;
A
Y
n
)
0
;
which means that up to a constant,
P
t+1
= "
t+1
+ VN
C
t
: (17)
This reduces to
P
i;t+1
= "
i;t+1
+
u
1;t+1

1
+
u
2;t+1

2
; iX; (18)
P
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+
u
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2
+
u
2;t+1

1
; jY;
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1
=
1

2
(
1
+ (1  
1
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; (19)

2
=
1

2

2
.
Equation (18) conrms fundamental traders' conjecture about the structure of the condi-
tional covariance matrix of returns: cov(P
i;t+1
;P
j;t+1
) is constant for all distinct assets i
and j in the same category, and it is also constant for all assets i and j in dierent categories.
We study equilibria in which the specic values of 
2
, 
1
, and 
2
conjectured by fundamental
traders are also conrmed by (18).
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Equation (18) shows that in this economy, there can be a common factor in the returns
of a group of stocks simply because those stocks happen to belong to the same category.
When noise traders experience a positive sentiment shock u
1;t+1
about category X, they
invest more in all securities in X, pushing the prices of these assets up together.
The intuition for why u
1;t+1
aects the return on stock 1 is clear enough: when noise
traders become bullish about old economy stocks, they channel funds into X, pushing the
prices of all securities in that category up. Why u
2;t+1
also aects the return on stock 1 is
less obvious. Suppose that noise traders become bullish about new economy stocks, pushing
up the prices of securities in Y . Fundamental traders, seeing an overvaluation, will short
stocks in Y , and hedge themselves against adverse fundamental news by buying stocks in
9
It is straightforward to show that such equilibria exist for a wide range of values of the exogeneous
parameters ,  
M
, 
2
u
, and 
u
.
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X. In this way, the sentiment shock about category Y , u
2;t+1
is also transmitted to stocks
in X.
The fact that in our model, noise traders aect prices { and hence also, patterns of
comovement { relies on the assumption that fundamental traders have horizons which end
before cash ow uncertainty is resolved at time T . If fundamental traders only cared about
wealth at time T , they would be much more aggressive in countering the eect of noise
traders. In particular, since in the limit as n ! 1, categories X and Y are claims to the
same nal cash ow, any dierence in the prices of X and Y would be quickly exploited by
fundamental traders. Since these traders have a one-period horizon, they are forced to worry
about future noise trader demand, which makes them invest less aggressively. Equations
(18) and (19) show that a high risk aversion  or perceived stock volatility 
2
make them
particularly reluctant to bet against the noise traders, increasing the impact of the sentiment
shocks on returns.
The idea that fundamental traders may have short horizons has been emphasized by
earlier work on limits to arbitrage (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldmann 1990, Shleifer
and Vishny 1997). That such constraints might limit arbitrage capacity is supported by the
considerable empirical evidence, cited in the introduction, suggesting that demand unrelated
to news about fundamental value aects security prices. Moreover, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya
(2001) conrm that arbitrageurs will be particularly wary of countering noise traders when
the risk of doing so is greater. They show that the price jump upon inclusion into an
index is much larger for stocks with poor substitutes, in other words, for those cases where
arbitrageurs face higher risk.
In order to uncover evidence of category-induced comovement, we look for testable pre-
dictions that are unique to this economy. One set of predictions describes what happens
when a stock enters a category that it was not previously a member of. Such reclassication
can occur in many ways. For example, if the market capitalization of a large-cap stock
declines suÆciently, it will enter the small-cap stock category. More simply, stocks are reg-
ularly added to indices like the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 to replace stocks that have been
removed due to bankruptcy or merger.
Proposition 1: Suppose that risky asset j, previously a member of Y; is reclassied into
X. Then, assuming a xed cash ow covariance matrix 
D
, the OLS esimate of 
j
in the
univariate regression
P
j;t
= 
j
+ 
j
P
X;t
+ v
j;t
; (20)
where
P
X;t
=
1
n
X
lX
P
l;t
; (21)
as well as the R
2
of this regression, increase after reclassication. In particular, before
11
reclassication, 
j
< 1, while after reclassication, 
j
= 1.
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The intuition is straightforward: when asset j enters category X, it starts being bueted
by noise traders' ows of funds in and out of that category. This increases its covariance
with the return on category X, P
X;t
, and hence also its beta loading on that return. For
simplicity, we assume that the cash ow covariance matrix remains xed. A more general
version of the proposition would predict that beta increases more than can be explained by
any increase in cash ow correlation.
A similar intuition lies behind the following prediction:
Proposition 2: Suppose that risky asset j, previously a member of Y; is reclassied as belong-
ing to X. Then assuming a xed cash ow covariance matrix 
D
, the OLS estimate of 
j;X
in the bivariate regression
P
j;t
= 
j
+ 
j;X
P
X;t
+ 
j;Y
P
Y;t
+ v
j;t
(22)
rises after reclassication, while the OLS estimate of 
j;Y
falls. In particular, before reclas-
sication

j;X
= 0, 
j;Y
= 1;
while after reclassication,

j;X
= 1; 
j;Y
= 0.
Proposition 2 identies a test that is potentially more powerful than the test in Propo-
sition 1. The essential prediction of the category view of comovement is that when a stock
enters category X, it is much more sensitive to the category X sentiment shock u
1;t+1
.
Of course, P
X;t
is not a clean measure of this sentiment shock; its variation comes pri-
marily from news about market-level cash ows, f
M;t+1
. In regression (22), P
Y;t+1
can be
thought of as a control for such news, making the coeÆcient on P
X;t+1
a cleaner measure
of sensitivity to u
1;t+1
.
Note that if, as in Section 2.1., there are no noise traders with demand function (12) in
the economy, or if fundamental traders are able to counteract their eect, Propositions 1
and 2 will not hold. In these cases, return correlation is completely determined by cash ow
correlation. Therefore if, as assumed in the propositions, the cash ow covariance matrix 
D
stays constant, the correlation structure of returns will also stay constant. In other words,

j
and R
2
in Proposition 1 and 
j;X
and 
j;Y
in Proposition 2 will remain unchanged after
reclassication.
One nal prediction of the category view of comovement is the following:
10
Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3: In the presence of noise traders with demand function (12), and in the limit
as the number of risky assets n!1, the correlation of the return on X with the return on
Y ,
corr(P
X;t
;P
Y;t
);
is lower than it would be in an economy that contains only fundamental traders.
When the economy contains only fundamental traders, the correlation of the returns of
categories X and Y is completely determined by the correlation of the fundamentals of those
two categories. As soon as noise traders are added to the mix, they generate ows of funds
in and out of the two categories, driving the prices of securities in the two categories in
dierent directions, and lowering the correlation between them.
Proposition 3 becomes testable in the time series if the number of noise traders with
demand functions in (12) grows over time; in that case, assuming a xed cash ow covariance
matrix, the correlation of the two categories' returns should fall over time.
2.3 Habitat-based Comovement
The habitat view of comovement starts from the observation that many investors trade only
a subset of all available securities. Such preferred habitats may arise because of transaction
costs, international trading restrictions, or lack of information (Merton, 1987). For example,
suppose that one group of investors { \habitatX" investors { trades only securities 1 through
n, a set we again refer to as X, while another group { habitat Y investors { trades only
n + 1 through 2n, set Y . We can think of assets 1 through n as U.S. stocks, and assets
n + 1 through 2n as U.K. stocks; there are many investors in both countries who restrict
themselves to trading only domestic securities. We emphasize that X and Y play dierent
roles here than in Section 2.2. There, they represent groups of assets that some investors
do not distinguish between when allocating their demand. Here, they represent groups of
assets that are the sole holdings of some investors.
Now suppose that habitat X investors experience an increase in risk aversion. They will
then reduce their positions in all the stocks they hold, generating a common factor in the
returns of securities in X, even if those stocks' fundamental values are uncorrelated. More
generally, the habitat view of comovement predicts a common factor in the returns of any
group of stocks that happens to be the primary holdings of a particular subset of investors.
In order to compare this view to the category-based view, suppose that habitat X in-
vestors have demand N
HX
i;t
for risky asset i, where
N
HX
i;t
=
1
n
[A
X
+ u
1;t
] ; iX (23)
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NHX
j;t
= 0; jY:
We think of u
1;t
as tracking their level of risk aversion, changes in which lead them to alter
their exposure to all assets in X. Of course, u
1;t
can also be interpreted as an indicator of
sentiment about the future returns of assets in X, although the model does not require such
an interpretation. By denition, habitat X investors' demand for assets in Y is zero.
Similarly, habitat Y investors' demand is
N
HY
i;t
= 0; iX (24)
N
HY
j;t
=
1
n
[A
Y
+ u
2;t
] ; jY .
We assume
 
u
1;t
u
2;t
!
 N
  
0
0
!
; 
2
u
 
1 
u

u
1
!!
; i.i.d. over time.
As before, we close the economy with fundamental traders who behave as in (5). Given
their expectations about future prices, current prices are given by
P
t
= E
F
t
(P
t+1
)  V
F
t
(Q  (N
H1
t
+N
H2
t
)) (25)
= E
F
t
(P
t+1
)  V
F
t
(Q N
C
t
);
exactly as in (13). In other words, even though investors' demand functions are motivated
dierently here than in the case of category-based comovement, prices are the same. Once
again, there will be a common factor in the returns of assets in X even if there is no common
factor in their fundamentals.
The equivalence in equation (25) means that Propositions 1 through 3 also hold in this
economy, withX and Y signifying investor habitats, not categories. For example, Proposition
1 should now be interpreted as predicting that if a stock becomes part of the habitat of a
specic group of investors, it will comove more with the other assets in that habitat than it
did before.
It is important to note that the habitat-based view of comovement depends on limits
to arbitrage, just as the category-based view does. The fact that some investors trade only
certain securities means that habitats X and Y can trade at dierent prices, even though in
the limit as n!1, their nal cash ows are identical. If fundamental traders were able to
wipe the discrepancy out completely, there would be no habitat-induced comovement.
3 Empirical Tests
Propositions 1 through 3 lay out predictions that hold in an economy where return comove-
ment is in part due to category-based or habitat-based trading ows, but which do not
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hold in an economy where return comovement is entirely a function of comovement in news
about fundamentals. We now test these predictions to see if we can uncover any evidence of
trading-induced comovement.
To test the propositions, we need to identify a group of securities with three characteris-
tics. First, the group must be viewed as a natural category, or must be a preferred habitat
for many investors, or both. Second, there must be clear and identiable changes in group
membership over time. Finally, a security's inclusion or removal from the group should not
carry information about the correlation of the security's cash ows with the cash ows of
other securities in the group.
One set of securities that satises these requirements is the S&P 500 index. In Section
2.2., we suggested identifying categories by looking at the products money managers oer
their clients. The immense popularity of S&P-linked products suggests that this index may
be a natural category in many investors' minds: S&P index funds and depositary receipts are
important investment vehicles for both institutions and individuals, while S&P 500 futures
are heavily traded by index arbitrageurs. The S&P 500 may also be a preferred habitat for
U.S. investors who are reluctant to invest in foreign stocks and who doubt that active fund
managers can outperform passive indices.
The S&P also has the second characteristic we require: there is clear and identiable
turnover in its membership. In a typical year there are about 30 changes; our full sample,
which we describe in Section 3.1, includes 375 additions and 51 deletions.
Finally, inclusion in the S&P 500 does not change a stock's cash ow characteristics,
nor does it aect the covariance of a stock's cash ows with other stocks' cash ows. The
stated goal of Standard and Poors is to make the index representative of the U.S. economy,
not to provide signals about future cash ows. Deletions from the index, however, are
another matter. Stocks are usually removed from the index because a rm is merging, being
taken over, or nearing bankruptcy. In these situations cash ow characteristics may well be
changing, so we exclude these cases from our deletion sample.
We therefore test Propositions 1 through 3 for the case where X is the S&P 500, and Y
is stocks outside that index. In Section 3.2., in line with Proposition 1, we test whether a
stock's beta with the S&P and the fraction of its variance explained by the index increase
(decrease) after the stock's inclusion in (removal from) the index. In Section 3.3., in line
with Proposition 2, we test whether a stock's beta with the S&P, controlling for the return of
non-S&P stocks, goes up (falls) after inclusion (deletion). Finally, in Section 3.5., motivated
by Proposition 3, we test whether the correlation of S&P and non-S&P stocks has fallen in
line with the growing importance of the S&P as a category.
Our null hypothesis, laid out in Section 2.1., is that return comovement is primarily a
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function of comovement in news about fundamentals, so that the betas and R
2
just described,
as well as the correlation of S&P and non-S&P stocks, do not change. The alternative
hypothesis is that trading ows do induce comovement, and that the betas, R
2
, and cross-
category correlation change as predicted in the propositions.
3.1 Data
We use S&P 500 index inclusions between September 22, 1976 and December 31, 1999 and
deletions between January 1, 1979 and December 31, 1999. Standard & Poor's did not record
announcement dates of index changes before September 1976 and we were unable to obtain
data on deletions before 1979.
There are 532 inclusion events in the inclusion sample period and 507 deletions in the
deletion sample period. Inclusion events are excluded if the new rm is a spin-o or a restruc-
tured version of a rm already in the index, if the rm is engaged in a merger or takeover
around the inclusion event, or if required return data is not available.
11
Deletion events
are excluded if the rm is involved in a merger, takeover, or bankruptcy proceeding. These
circumstances, determined by searching the NEXIS database, exclude the vast majority of
deletions. The nal sample includes 375 inclusions and 51 deletions.
12
3.2 Univariate Regressions
If category-induced or habitat-induced trading ows cause return comovement, Proposition
1 predicts that stocks which are added to (deleted from) the S&P 500 will comove more
(less) with the other members of the index after the addition or deletion event.
For each inclusion and deletion { in other words, for each event { we run the univariate
regression
R
j;t
= 
j
+ 
j
R
S&P;t
+ v
j;t
(26)
separately for the period before the event and for the period after the event, and record the
change in slope coeÆcient, 
j
, and the change in R
2
, R
2
j
. R
j;t
is the return of the stock
involved in the change between time t 1 and t, while R
S&P;t
is the contemporaneous return
on the S&P 500 index, obtained from CRSP.
13
11
This last possibility may arise if the inclusion occurs so close to the end of the sample that it prevents
us from estimating post-event betas.
12
The S&P 500 inclusion and deletion data are available upon request.
13
In order to avoid spurious eects, we remove the contribution of the stock in question from the right-
hand side variable. For addition events, this means that there are 500 stocks in the right-hand side variable
before the addition, and 499 afterward. The reverse applies for deletion events.
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Table 1 reports the change in slope coeÆcient, averaged across all events in the sample,
, as well as the average change in R
2
, R
2
, for three dierent data frequencies: daily,
weekly, and monthly. With daily and weekly data, the pre-event regression is run over the 12
month period ending the month before the month of the inclusion announcement, while the
post-event regression is run over a 12 month period starting the month after the month of
the inclusion implementation. In the case of monthly data, we use a ve year period ending
a month before the announcement month and a ve year period starting a month after the
implementation month for the pre-event and post-event regressions, respectively.
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Table 1 also reports a quantity we call the average relative change in R
2
, R
2
. The
motivation for including this additional statistic is the work of Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Yu (2001), who report that the fraction of an individual stock's variance that can be
explained by movements in a diversied portfolio has steadily declined over the past three
decades. In other words, the R
2
in regressions like (26) has on average gone down for the full
universe of stocks. This can confound a test of trading-based comovement: when a stock is
added to the S&P, trading pressure may work to raise the R
2
in (26), but this may be more
than oset by the overall downward trend in R
2
over time.
Our \relative change in R
2
" measure controls for the trend identied by Campbell et al.
(2001). For each stock that is included or removed from the index, we compute the change
in R
2
after the event minus the average change in R
2
over the same time period experienced
by stocks already in the S&P 500. Finally, we compute the average of this relative change in
R
2
across all events in the sample and report it in Table 1.
The standard errors in the table deserve comment. If two events are close together in
calendar time, there may be substantial overlap in the time periods covered by the regressions
associated with each event. This means that the disturbances v
j;t
may be correlated across
events, which in turn implies that the 
j
may not be independent but rather autocorrelated
at several lags.
We use simulation methods to compute standard errors that account for this dependence.
We generate a simulated data set, consisting of an S&P return and returns on included stocks,
and set the cross-sectional correlation of the disturbance terms to whatever value generates
a rst-order autocorrelation in the 
j
's equal to that observed in our results. We then
compute  in this sample, under the null that betas do not change after inclusion. By
generating many such data sets, we obtain the distribution of  under the null, and hence
14
Up until October 1989, inclusions and deletions were made eective on the day of their announcement.
Since then, the changes have been announced a few weeks in advance of their actual implementation. It
is not clear whether to view the to-be-added stock as being in the index, or not in the index during the
time between announcement and implementation; signicant price eects have been documented on both
days. To avoid these issues entirely, we do not use data from the month of the announcement or of the
implementation; these are almost always the same month.
17
also, appropriate standard errors.
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Panel A of Table 1 conrms that stocks added to the S&P 500 experience a signicant
increase in daily beta, while those removed experience a signicant decrease. In the full
sample of additions, the median increase in daily beta is 0.132. For deletions, the median
decrease in beta is -0.163. The middle and right-hand columns report that there are also
signicant changes in both R
2
and relative R
2
in the direction predicted by Proposition 1.
The results in the second half of the addition sample tend to be stronger than those in the
rst half.
Panel B shows that the results are similar in weekly data. There is a signicant jump in
beta and R
2
for additions, and a signicant drop in beta for deletions, although no signicant
decrease in R
2
for deletions. Panel C shows that the results are weaker in monthly data.
In the second half of the addition sample, there are statistically signicant increases in beta
and in relative R
2
but in the rst half the results are signicant in the opposite direction.
3.3 Bivariate Regressions
The univariate regressions provide some evidence of trading-based comovement at higher
frequencies. Stronger evidence comes from tests of Proposition 2, which predicts that con-
trolling for the return of non-S&P stocks, a stock that is added to or removed from the
S&P will experience a large change in its loading on the S&P return. To test this, for each
inclusion and deletion, we run the bivariate regression
R
j;t
= 
j
+ 
j;S&P
R
S&P;t
+ 
j;non-S&P
R
non-S&P;t
+ v
j;t
(27)
for the period before the event and the period after the event, and record the changes in
S&P and non-S&P betas, 
j;S&P
and 
j;non-S&P
. R
non-S&P;t
is the return on non-S&P
stocks in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq universe between time t   1 and time t. This
last variable is inferred from index return and capitalization data using the identity that
the capitalization-weighted average return of S&P stocks and of non-S&P stocks equals the
overall CRSP value-weighted return on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks. The S&P return
and CRSP return are easily computed, allowing us to deduce the non-S&P return.
Table 2 reports the change in S&P beta, averaged across all events in the sample, 
S&P
,
as well as the average change in non-S&P beta, 
non-S&P
. As before, we present results
for daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies. Daily and weekly regressions are run over a 12
15
It turns out that at least for daily and weekly frequencies, cross-correlation of disturbances does not aect
the standard errors by very much. The reason is that such cross-correlation produces positive autocorrelation
in the 
j
at the rst few lags but negative autocorrelation at higher lags. As a result, the variance of 
is only slightly higher than if the disturbances were uncorrelated.
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month period ending the month before the announcement month and over a 12 month period
starting the month after the implementation month. The monthly regressions use ve year
periods before announcement and after implementation.
The results in Table 2 are stronger than the univariate results. At all three data frequen-
cies, S&P 500 inclusion is associated with a substantial and signicant increase in beta with
the S&P and a substantial and signicant decrease in beta with the rest of the market. For
example, daily beta with the S&P 500 goes up by a median of 0.380 and daily beta with
other stocks drops by -0.397. Large and signicant results obtain for most subsamples, even
in monthly data, as well as for deletion events.
Figures 1 through 3 use rolling regressions to show the dynamics of these changes. Panel
A shows how the daily betas change over event time. The solid line shows the median daily
beta with the S&P and the dashed line shows the median daily beta with the non-S&P. These
coeÆcients are re-estimated each month using the prior 12 months of daily data. Therefore
coeÆcients plotted to the left of the left vertical line use only pre-event returns. CoeÆcients
plotted to the right of the right vertical line use only post-event returns. CoeÆcients in
between use both pre- and post-event data. In terms of these gures, the beta changes
reported in Table 2 are the average beta as of event month +12, which uses data from months
[+1, +12] minus the average beta as of event month -1, which uses data from months [-12,
-1]. There are fewer data points in the gures than in the table, however, because the gures
include only rms that survived for some period after the inclusion.
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Our results on changes in S&P and non-S&P betas are consistent with the ndings of
Vijh (1994), who studies whether the rise of S&P-linked products has aected the standard
measure of stock risk, namely beta with respect to the overall market return. He nds that
over the 1975-1989 period, a stock's daily beta with the market goes up by a statistically
signicant 0.08, on average, after inclusion. Since a large fraction of overall market value
comes from S&P stocks, this ts with the increase in S&P beta we detect over a similar time
period. Given our result that non-S&P beta falls signicantly, it also makes sense that the
rise in overall market beta should be considerably smaller than the rise in S&P beta.
17
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Our bivariate regression results cast doubt on an alternative interpretation of our ndings. Suppose
that a particular industry becomes important in the economy. Standard and Poors may then decide to add
a number of rms in this industry to the index in rapid succession. These stocks will then comove more
with the index after inclusion simply because the index contains more stocks in the same industry after
their inclusion than it did before. However, under this interpretation, the industry would also be growing in
importance outside the S&P, predicting a rise in non-S&P beta after inclusion, rather than the decrease we
actually observe.
17
Under the CAPM, an increase in overall market beta after inclusion predicts that stocks should drop
in price when they are added to the index. The fact that such stocks actually display large price increases
upon inclusion clearly rejects this prediction.
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3.4 Calendar Time Tests
The methodology we use to test Propositions 1 and 2 in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 is often called
an \event time" approach. An alternative methodology is a \calendar time" approach. This
approach requires the construction of two portfolios: a \pre-event" portfolio whose return at
time t, R
pre;t
, is the equal-weighted average return at time t of all stocks that will be added
to the index within some window after time t; and a \post-event" portfolio whose return
at time t, R
post;t
, is the equal-weighted average return at time t of all stocks that have been
added to the index within some window preceeding time t. In our analyses of daily and
weekly data, we take the window to be a year, and extend it to ve years for monthly data.
The calendar time test of Proposition 1 then calls for running two regressions:
R
pre;t
= 
pre
+ 
pre
R
S&P;t
+ v
pre;t
and
R
post;t
= 
post
+ 
post
R
S&P;t
+ v
post;t
and checking whether 
post
> 
pre
and whether the R
2
in the second regression is greater
than in the rst.
Similarly, the calendar time test of Proposition 2 calls for running the following two
regressions,
R
pre;t
= 
pre
+ 
pre;S&P
R
S&P;t
+ 
pre;non S&P
R
non S&P;t
+ v
pre;t
and
R
post;t
= 
post
+ 
post;S&P
R
S&P;t
+ 
post;non S&P
R
non S&P;t
+ v
post;t
and checking whether 
post;S&P
> 
pre;S&P
and 
post;non S&P
< 
pre;non S&P
.
Table 3 reports the changes in slope coeÆcients and R
2
s. In general, the results are
supportive of trading-based comovement, but not as strongly so as the event time tests. In the
univariate regressions, signicant increases in beta and R
2
occur only at the daily frequency.
In the bivariate regressions, the results are strongly signicant at the daily frequency and at
the weekly frequency, although in the latter case only in the second subsample.
One reason the results are slightly weaker here may be that the calendar time test is
less powerful than the event time test. For example, if inclusion events that generate large
increases in beta tend to cluster together, the calendar time methodology will nd it harder
to reject the null, since it essentially treats events close together in calendar time as a single
observation.
18
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Moreover, there is a sound economic argument for such clustering: if index funds do not rebalance at
times of low index turnover { because the tracking error from not rebalancing is small { but only do so when
multiple index changes occur, events with high beta increases will indeed cluster.
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3.5 Comovement Across Categories
Proposition 3 predicts that the correlation of the returns of two groups of securities will be
lower than the correlation of their fundamentals if these groups form natural categories or
habitats. This proposition is testable in the time series under the condition that the groups'
importance as categories or habitats has grown over time.
The S&P 500 satises this last condition: its use in various investment styles has grown
dramatically in the last few decades. Consistent with this trend, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya
(2001) nd that the size of the inclusion price jump has grown with the volume of funds
devoted to S&P indexing, and our earlier results show increasing comovement eects in more
recent years.
Table 4 reports the trends in comovement between the S&P and other stocks over the
past thirty years. The left column shows that the relative size of the S&P and whole market
has remained constant. The declining correlations in the right columns show that at all
three data frequencies, the returns on the S&P 500 have grown increasingly divorced from
the returns on the rest of the market. The correlation in returns remains high today, but it
is not as high as it was prior to the advent of the S&P 500 as a category. Another interesting
pattern is that the decline in the daily correlation seems to have halted in recent years, while
the weekly and monthly correlations continue to decline.
In Table 5 we determine whether the decreasing correlation between S&P and non-S&P
stocks is statistically signicant, or whether the correlation between two random groups
would on average display a similar decline. We construct value-weighted returns on a random
group of 500 stocks and compute their correlation with the value-weighted returns on the
rest of the market over consecutive ve year periods. By repeating this procedure for many
random groups of 500 stocks, we can construct sampling distributions for the change in
correlation over various intervals. We can then determine whether the decline in the S&P
correlation is unusually large.
The left columns of Table 5 report the sampling distribution of the changes in correlation
between the random 500 and the rest of the market. The correlations between random
groups of stocks have declined. Panel A shows that, from the early 1970s to the late 1990s,
the daily return correlation between random groups has fallen by a median of -0.043. For
comparison, the second column from the right reports the experience of the S&P 500. Over
this same period, Table 4 indicates that the daily return correlation between the S&P and
the rest of the market has fallen by -0.118. The last column indicates that this is a much
greater decline than expected by chance.
Our simulation controls for the possibility that the decline in the S&P and non-S&P
return correlation is due to a general decline in the correlation of stock fundamentals. Indeed,
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the results of Campbell et al. (2001) suggest that such a decline in fundamental correlation
has occured, making it important to control for. Our simulation does not, however, rule out
the possibility that our results are due to an especially large decline in the correlation of S&P
500 stocks' fundamentals with remaining stocks' fundamentals, as compared to the decline in
the correlation of a random 500 stocks' fundamentals with remaining stocks' fundamentals.
However, we see no obvious reason why this would be the case, since the S&P 500 index has
always been constructed to be representative of the overall economy.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we present and examine empirically three models of comovement. The tradi-
tional model attributes comovement to correlation in news about fundamental values. The
two alternative models we consider explain comovement by correlated investor demand shifts
for securities in a given category, or by demand shifts by specic investor clienteles.
To assess these theories, we consider the well-studied phenomenon of stock inclusions
into, and deletions from, the S&P 500 index. While previous studies have noted signicant
immediate price eects associated with inclusions and deletions, we focus on changes in the
patterns of comovement of newly included (or deleted) stocks with stocks already in the
index. We nd that stocks included into the index begin to comove more with other stocks
in the index, and less with stocks out of the index. The converse holds for deletions. Because
inclusion into the S&P 500 index conveys no news about fundamentals, this evidence is hard
to reconcile with the fundamentals view of comovement, but supports the theories based on
shifts in demand.
This evidence adds to the growing range of phenomena identied by nancial economists
that reveal the importance of asset classication, and of demand shifts among asset classes,
for valuation. From this perspective, a security's value may depend as much on which
asset categories it belongs to, and on which investor clienteles trade it, as it does on its
fundamentals.
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Panel A of Table 4 also shows that the abrupt halt in the decline of the daily S&P correlation after 1990
is not mirrored by the random-500 correlation, while the weekly and monthly S&P correlations continue to
decline relative to the typical random-500 group. One explanation is that arbitrage has checked the decline
in the daily correlation, but has yet to stop the decline in the weekly and monthly correlations. De Long et
al. (1990) point out that long-horizon arbitrage is likely to be weaker than short-horizon arbitrage.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3: Suppose that asset n + 1 is reclassied from Y into X,
and that at the same moment, asset 1 is reclassied from X into Y .
Before reclassication,
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After reclassication, P
X;t+1
and P
Y;t+1
are still given by (28), but now
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: (30)
This implies
cov (P
n+1;t+1
;P
X;t+1
) =  
2
M
+
1   
2
M
n
+ 2
2
u
(
1

2
1
+
1

2
2
) +
4
2
u

u

1

2
; (31)
cov (P
n+1;t+1
;P
Y;t+1
) =  
2
M
+
4
2
u

1

2
+ 2
2
u

u
(
1

2
1
+
1

2
2
);
while var(P
X;t
), var(P
Y;t
), and cov(P
X;t+1
;P
Y;t+1
) remain the same as before.
Since the OLS estimate of 
n+1
in the regression
P
n+1;t+1
= 
n+1
+ 
n+1
P
X;t+1
+ v
n+1;t+1
(32)
23
is given by

n+1
=
cov(P
n+1;t+1
;P
X;t+1
)
var(P
X;t+1
)
; (33)
expressions (29) and (31) taken together with
1

2
1
+
1

2
2
 
2

1

2
= (
1

1
 
1

2
)
2
 0;
conrm that 
n+1
increases after reclassication as claimed in Proposition 1. In particular,
before reclassication, 
n+1
< 1, while after reclassication, 
n+1
= 1.
The OLS estimates of 
n+1;X
and 
n+1;Y
in the regression
P
n+1;t+1
= 
n+1
+ 
n+1;X
P
X;t+1
+ 
n+1;Y
P
Y;t+1
+ v
n+1;t+1
(34)
are given by
 

n+1;X

n+1;Y
!
=
1
V
X
V
Y
  C
2
XY
 
V
Y
 C
XY
 C
XY
V
X
! 
C
n+1;X
C
n+1;Y
!
(35)
where
V
k
= var(P
k;t+1
); k = X; Y
C
XY
= cov(P
X;t+1
;P
Y;t+1
)
C
n+1;k
= cov(P
n+1;t+1
;P
k;t+1
), k = X; Y .
Before reclassication, C
n+1;X
= C
XY
and C
n+1;Y
= V
Y
, which implies

n+1;X
= 0; 
n+1;Y
= 1;
while after reclassication, C
n+1;X
= V
X
and C
n+1;Y
= C
XY
, which implies

n+1;X
= 1; 
n+1;Y
= 0:
Therefore 
n+1;X
does indeed increase after reclassication, while 
n+1;Y
falls. This proves
Proposition 2.
Finally, given the expressions for var(P
X;t+1
), var(P
Y;t+1
), and cov(P
X;t+1
;P
Y;t+1
)
in equation (29), it is immediate that in the limit as n!1,
corr(P
X;t+1
;P
Y;t+1
) <
 
2
M
 
2
M
+
1  
2
M
n
= corr(D
X;t+1
;D
Y;t+1
):
This proves Proposition 3.
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Table 1. Changes in comovement of stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index: Univariate results. Changes in the slope and the fit of 
regressions of returns on stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index on returns of the S&P 500 Index. The sample includes stocks added to and deleted 
from the S&P 500 between 1976 and 1998 which were not involved in mergers or related events (described in the text), and which have sufficient return data on 
CRSP. For each added stock j, the univariate model  
tjtSPjjtj RR ,,500, uba ++=  
is separately estimated for the pre-change and post-change period. Returns on the S&P 500 (RSP500) are from the CRSP Index on the S&P 500 Universe file. 
Returns from October 1987 are excluded. The mechanical influence of the added or deleted stock is removed from the independent variable. The average 
difference between the pre-change slope and the post-change slope is denoted bD . The average change in regression 2R  is denoted 2RD . The difference-in-
difference 2R is the change between the pre-change and post-change difference between the added stock’s 2R and the average 2R of the other stocks currently 
in the Index, and the average is denoted 2RDD . The pre-change and post-change estimation periods are [-12,-1] and [+1,+12] months for daily and weekly 
returns and [-60,-1] and [+1,+60] months for monthly returns. Panels A, B, and C show results for daily, weekly, and monthly returns, respectively. Standard 
errors are determined by simulation, to account for cross-correlation, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels in one-sided tests, respectively.  
 
  
bD  
   
2RD  
   
2RDD  
  
 
 
 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
N 
  
Mean 
(s.e.) 
 
Median 
   
Mean 
(s.e.) 
 
Median 
   
Mean 
(s.e.) 
 
Median 
 
 
Panel A. Daily Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
377 
  
0.116*** 
(0.020) 
 
0.131*** 
(0.025) 
   
0.051*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
   
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
176 
 
  
0.059** 
(0.025) 
 
0.046 
(0.031) 
   
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.014 
(0.010) 
   
0.006 
(0.007) 
 
0.007 
(0.009) 
 
  
1987-1998 
 
 
201 
  
0.166*** 
(0.030) 
 
0.231*** 
(0.038) 
   
0.074*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.085*** 
(0.010) 
   
0.086*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.079*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
52 
  
-0.150*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.168** 
(0.074) 
   
-0.009 
(0.008) 
 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
   
-0.022*** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
 
Panel B. Weekly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
377 
  
0.049* 
(0.027) 
 
0.054 
(0.034) 
   
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
   
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
176 
 
  
0.011 
(0.039) 
 
0.019 
(0.049) 
   
0.016 
(0.013) 
 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
   
0.032** 
(0.016) 
 
0.024 
(0.020) 
 
 
 
 
1987-1998 
 
 
201 
  
0.083** 
(0.038) 
 
0.082 
(0.048) 
   
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
   
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
52 
  
-0.260* 
(0.133) 
 
-0.211 
(0.166) 
   
-0.011 
(0.011) 
 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
   
0.018 
(0.016) 
 
0.034 
(0.020) 
 
 
Panel C. Monthly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1994 
 
 
213 
  
-0.029 
(0.053) 
 
-0.039 
(0.066) 
   
-0.020 
(0.020) 
 
-0.023 
(0.026) 
   
-0.015 
(0.022) 
 
0.004 
(0.028) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
133 
 
  
-0.106 
(0.078) 
 
-0.134 
(0.095) 
   
-0.016 
(0.032) 
 
-0.024 
(0.039) 
   
-0.070** 
(0.034) 
 
-0.055 
(0.042) 
 
  
1987-1994 
 
 
80 
  
0.099 
(0.094) 
 
0.100 
(0.129) 
   
-0.025 
(0.041) 
 
-0.023 
(0.051) 
   
0.076* 
(0.041) 
 
0.094* 
(0.051) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1994 
 
 
21 
  
-0.147 
(0.117) 
 
-0.046 
(0.147) 
   
-0.016 
(0.034) 
 
-0.042 
(0.043) 
   
0.020 
(0.029) 
 
0.024 
(0.036) 
 
Table 2. Changes in comovement of stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index: Bivariate results. 
Changes in the slopes of regressions of returns on stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index on returns of 
the S&P 500 Index itself and returns on an index of the non-S&P 500 rest of the market. The sample includes stocks 
added to and deleted from the S&P 500 between 1976 and 1998 which were not involved in mergers or related 
events (described in the text), and which have sufficient return data on CRSP. A capitalization-weighted return 
index of non-S&P 500 stocks (RnonSP500) in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq is inferred from the identity 
 
tSP
tCRSP
tSP
tnonSP
tCRSP
tSPtCRSP
tVWCRSP RCAP
CAP
R
CAP
CAPCAP
R ,500
1,
1,500
,500
1,
1,5001,
, ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ -
=
-
-
-
-- . 
 
Returns on the S&P 500 (RSP500) and total capitalization (CAPSP500) are from the CRSP Index on the S&P 500 
Universe file. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq index (RVWCRSP) and total 
capitalization (CAPCRSP) are from the CRSP Stock Index file. Returns from October 1987 are excluded. For each 
added stock j, the bivariate model  
tjtnonSPnonSPjtSPSPjjtj RRR ,,500500,,500500,, ubba +++=  
is separately estimated for the pre-change and post-change period. The mechanical influence of the added or deleted 
stock is removed from the independent variables. The average differences between pre-change and post-change 
slopes are denoted 500SPbD  and 500nonSPbD . The pre-change and post-change estimation periods are [-12,-1] and 
[+1,+12] months for daily and weekly returns and [-60,-1] and [+1,+60] months for monthly returns. Panels A, B, 
and C show results for daily, weekly, and monthly returns, respectively. Standard errors are determined by 
simulation, to account for cross-correlation, and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in one-sided tests, respectively.  
 
 
 
500SPbD  
   
500nonSPbD  
 
 
 
Sample 
 
 
N  
 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
 
Median 
   
Mean 
(s.e.) 
 
Median 
 
 
Panel A. Daily Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
377 
  
0.346*** 
(0.029) 
 
0.380*** 
(0.036) 
   
-0.355*** 
(0.035) 
 
-0.382*** 
(0.044) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
176 
 
  
0.273*** 
(0.045) 
 
0.270*** 
(0.056) 
   
-0.287*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.283*** 
(0.069) 
 
  
1987-1998 
 
 
201 
  
0.409*** 
(0.037) 
 
0.432*** 
(0.046) 
   
-0.415*** 
(0.046) 
 
-0.420*** 
(0.058) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
52 
  
-0.633*** 
(0.140) 
 
-0.419*** 
(0.175) 
   
0.693*** 
(0.159) 
 
0.482*** 
(0.199) 
 
 
 
Panel B. Weekly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
377 
  
0.165*** 
(0.059) 
 
0.251*** 
(0.074) 
   
-0.137** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.125* 
(0.076) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
176 
 
  
0.112 
(0.102) 
 
0.233** 
(0.128) 
   
-0.127 
(0.099) 
 
-0.105  
(0.124) 
 
  
1987-1998 
 
 
201 
  
0.211*** 
(0.066) 
 
0.263*** 
(0.083) 
   
-0.145** 
(0.075) 
 
-0.139* 
(0.094) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1998 
 
 
52 
  
-0.486*** 
(0.164) 
 
-0.362** 
(0.205) 
   
0.361** 
(0.213) 
 
0.399* 
(0.266) 
 
 
Panel C. Monthly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1994 
 
 
213 
  
0.281*** 
(0.115) 
 
0.332*** 
(0.144) 
   
-0.248** 
(0.109) 
 
-0.368*** 
(0.136) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
133 
 
  
0.204 
(0.176) 
 
0.346* 
(0.221) 
   
-0.186 
(0.162) 
 
-0.327* 
(0.203) 
 
  
1987-1994 
 
 
80 
  
0.408** 
(0.225) 
 
0.321 
(0.282) 
   
-0.352* 
(0.239) 
 
-0.404* 
(0.300) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1994 
 
 
21 
  
0.034 
(0.351) 
 
0.112 
(0.440) 
   
-0.121 
(0.342) 
 
-0.055 
(0.429) 
 
Table 3. Changes in comovement of stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index (Calendar time): 
Univariate and bivariate results.  Differences between the comovement characteristics of two portfolios of stocks: 
those about to be added to the S&P 500 and those just recently added. The sample includes stocks added to and 
deleted from the S&P 500 between 1976 and 1999 which were not involved in mergers or related events (described 
in the text), and which have sufficient return data on CRSP. A capitalization-weighted return index of non-S&P 500 
stocks (RnonSP500) in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq is inferred from the identity 
 
tSP
tCRSP
tSP
tnonSP
tCRSP
tSPtCRSP
tVWCRSP RCAP
CAP
R
CAP
CAPCAP
R ,500
1,
1,500
,500
1,
1,5001,
, ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
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ø
ö
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è
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Returns on the S&P 500 (RSP500) and total capitalization (CAPSP500) are from the CRSP Index on the S&P 500 
Universe file. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq index (RVWCRSP) and total 
capitalization (CAPCRSP) are from the CRSP Stock Index file. Returns from October 1987 are excluded. In daily 
data, for example, each day we form an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks that will be added to the S&P 500 within 
the next year, and a portfolio of stocks that were added within in the past year. We then run separate univariate 
regressions for each portfolio on the S&P 500 index, 
tpretSPprepretpre RR ,,500, uba ++=   and  tposttSPpostposttpost RR ,,500, uba ++= , 
denoting the difference in slope and fit between the “post” and “pre” regressions as bD  and 2RD , respectively. 
We also run separate bivariate regressions for each portfolio on the S&P 500 and the non-S&P500 rest of the 
market, 
tpretnonSPnonSPpretSPSPprepretpre RRR ,,500500,,500500,, ubba +++=   and 
tposttnonSPnonSPposttSPSPpostposttpost RRR ,,500500,,500500,, ubba +++= , 
denoting the difference in the slopes as 500SPbD  and 500nonSPbD , respectively. The mechanical influence of the pre 
and post portfolio stocks is removed, as appropriate, from the independent variables. In daily and weekly data, the 
pre portfolio includes stocks that will be added within one year and the post portfolio includes stocks that were 
added in the past year. In monthly data, these windows are extended to five years. We require at least 10 stocks in 
each portfolio in order to be included in the regressions. (Since there are never at least 10 useable deletions within 
one year, there are no observations for daily and weekly deletions portfolios.) Asymptotic standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in one-sided tests, 
respectively. 
  
 
Univariate 
   
Bivariate 
 
 
 
Sample 
 
 
 
T  
 
 
bD  
(s.e.) 
 
2RD  
(s.e.) 
   
500SPbD  
(s.e.) 
 
500nonSPbD  
(s.e.) 
 
 
Panel A. Daily Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
3853 
  
0.126*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.101*** 
(0.007) 
   
0.357*** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.373*** 
(0.029) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
1642 
 
  
0.077*** 
(0.021) 
 
0. 041*** 
(0.010) 
   
0.252*** 
(0.041) 
 
-0.262*** 
(0.050) 
 
  
1987-1999 
 
 
2211 
  
0.156*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.138*** 
(0.010) 
   
0.406*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.426*** 
(0.035) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
0 
  
. 
 
. 
   
. 
 
. 
 
 
Panel B. Weekly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
796 
  
0.044* 
(0.027) 
 
0.012 
(0.014) 
   
0.090** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.072 
(0.058) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
339 
 
  
0.029 
(0.043) 
 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
   
-0.050 
(0.104) 
 
0.078 
(0.108) 
 
  
1987-1999 
 
 
457 
  
0.057* 
(0.035) 
 
0.039** 
(0.022) 
   
0.149*** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.145** 
(0.069) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
0 
  
. 
 
. 
   
. 
 
. 
 
 
Panel C. Monthly Returns 
 
 
Additions 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
268 
  
-0.018 
(0.031) 
 
0.042* 
(0.030) 
   
0.079 
(0.068) 
 
-0.126** 
(0.060) 
 
  
1976-1986 
 
 
116 
 
  
-0.011 
(0.043) 
 
0.021 
(0.048) 
   
0.144* 
(0.105) 
 
-0.169** 
(0.088) 
 
  
1987-1999 
 
 
152 
  
-0.020 
(0.044) 
 
0.067 
(0.067) 
   
0.076 
(0.088) 
 
-0.136* 
(0.084) 
 
 
Deletions 
 
1976-1999 
 
 
78 
  
-0.018 
(0.137) 
 
-0.110** 
(0.058) 
   
-0.047 
(0.268) 
 
0.027 
(0.250) 
 
 
Table 4. Trends in the correlation between returns on the S&P 500 and the rest of the market. The correlation 
between the S&P 500 and the rest of the market. A capitalization-weighted return index of non-S&P 500 stocks 
(RnonSP500) in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq is inferred from the identity 
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Returns on the S&P 500 (RSP500) and total capitalization (CAPSP500) are from the CRSP Index on the S&P 500 
Universe file. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq index (RVWCRSP) and total 
capitalization (CAPCRSP) are from the CRSP Stock Index file. Returns from October 1987 are excluded.  
 
 
 
Correlation between S&P 500 and the rest of the market 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
 
Mean of 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
tCRSP
tSP
CAP
CAP
,
,500  
 
 
Daily Returns 
 
Weekly Returns 
 
Monthly Returns 
 
1970 – 1974 
 
0.689 
 
0.941 
 
0.942 
 
0.931 
 
1975 – 1979 
 
0.685 
 
0.898 
 
0.920 
 
0.925 
 
1980 – 1984 
 
0.670 
 
0.871 
 
0.915 
 
0.929 
 
1985 – 1989 
 
0.683 
 
0.825 
 
0.864 
 
0.912 
 
1990 – 1994 
 
0.690 
 
0.817 
 
0.851 
 
0.901 
 
1995 – 1999 
 
 
0.701 
 
0.823 
 
0.810 
 
0.840 
 
Table 5. Test that the declining correlation between the S&P 500 and the rest of the market is unusual. The decline in correlation between returns on the 
S&P 500 and the rest of the market is evaluated relative to the null hypothesis that a similar decline applies to random categories of stocks. The distribution of 
changes in the correlation between the return on 500 random stocks from NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq and the value-weighted return on the rest of the market is 
determined by simulation. The following procedure is repeated 500 times: (i) A sample of 500 random stocks from the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq is identified 
from all stocks that CRSP lists for 1970. The complementary set of stocks, i.e. the rest of the market, is also identified as of 1970. (ii) The daily, weekly, and 
monthly correlation between these two portfolios is computed and recorded each year from 1970 through 1999. If a stock drops out of the random 500 sample, it 
is replaced with a stock randomly taken from the rest of the market sample. Returns from October 1987 are excluded. (iii) These two return series represent one 
sample path, over which correlations and changes in correlations can be estimated. Panels A, B, and C show results for daily, weekly, and monthly returns, 
respectively.  
 
  
Change in correlation between random 500 
and the rest of the market 
   
Change in correlation between S&P 500  
and the rest of the market 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
 
5th  
percentile 
 
10th 
percentile 
 
50th 
percentile 
 
90th 
percentile 
 
95th 
percentile 
 
 
Actual 
 
 
Prob ( Actual < X ) 
 
Panel A. Daily Returns 
 
 
1995 – 1999 vs.  
1970 – 1974  - 0.070 - 0.064 -0.043 - 0.023 - 0.019 
 
 
- 0.118 
 
 
0.002 
 
1975 – 1979 - 0.073 - 0.066 -0.045 - 0.028 - 0.024 
 
- 0.075 
 
0.040 
 
1980 – 1984  - 0.070 - 0.065 -0.042 - 0.023 - 0.019 
 
- 0.048 
 
0.344 
 
1985 – 1989 - 0.079 - 0.073 -0.053 - 0.037 - 0.032 
 
- 0.002 
 
0.996 
 
1990 – 1994  
 
 
- 0.048 
 
- 0.042 
 
-0.026 
  
- 0.012 
 
- 0.009 
 
+ 0.006 
 
0.998 
 
 
Panel B. Weekly Returns 
 
 
1995 – 1999 vs.  
1970 – 1974  - 0.076 - 0.073 -0.050 - 0.032 - 0.026 
 
 
- 0.132 
 
 
0.002 
 
1975 – 1979 - 0.076 - 0.071 -0.050 - 0.030 - 0.025 
 
- 0.110 
 
0.002 
 
1980 – 1984  - 0.068 - 0.064 -0.044 - 0.020 - 0.016 
 
- 0.105 
 
0.002 
 
1985 – 1989 - 0.075 - 0.069 -0.050 - 0.033 - 0.029 
 
- 0.054 
 
0.090 
 
1990 – 1994  
 
  
- 0.051 
  
- 0.045 
 
-0.029 
 
- 0.012 
 
- 0.008 
 
- 0.041 
 
0.136 
 
Panel C. Monthly Returns 
 
 
1995 – 1999 vs.  
1970 – 1974  - 0.115 - 0.103 -0.060 - 0.030 - 0.025 
 
 
- 0.091 
 
 
0.162 
 
1975 – 1979 - 0.114 - 0.102 -0.059 - 0.030 - 0.023 
 
- 0.085 
 
0.202 
 
1980 – 1984  - 0.102 - 0.090 -0.050 - 0.018 - 0.008 
 
- 0.089 
 
0.112 
 
1985 – 1989 - 0.116 - 0.105 -0.066 - 0.036 - 0.031 
 
- 0.072 
 
0.390 
 
1990 – 1994  
 
 
- 0.095 
 
- 0.083 
 
- 0.045 
 
- 0.017 
 
- 0.012 
 
- 0.061 
 
0.274 
 
  
Figure I. Changes in comovement of stocks added to the S&P 500 Index: Bivariate results.  Plots of 
the median slope coefficients of bivariate regressions of returns on stocks added to the S&P 500 on returns 
of the S&P 500 Index and the non-S&P 500 rest of the market. The sample includes stocks added to the 
S&P 500 which were not involved in mergers or related events (described in the text), which have complete 
returns data over the entire event horizon examined in each figure (-12 to +24 months in daily and weekly 
returns data and –60 to +120 months in monthly returns data), and which remain in the Index for the full 
post-event horizon considered in each figure. A capitalization-weighted return index of non-S&P 500 
stocks (RnonSP500) in the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq is inferred from the identity 
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Returns on the S&P 500 (RSP500) and total capitalization (CAPSP500) are from the CRSP Index on the S&P 
500 Universe file. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq index (RVWCRSP) and 
total capitalization (CAPCRSP) are from the CRSP Stock Index file. Returns from October 1987 are 
excluded. For each added stock j, the bivariate model  
tjtnonSPnonSPjtSPSPjjtj RRR ,,500500,,500500,, υββα +++=  
is then estimated in rolling regressions where the sample intervals are [-12,-1] months for daily and weekly 
returns and [-60,-1] months for monthly returns. The mechanical influence of the added stock is removed, 
as appropriate, from both independent variables. The median of each coefficient, across stocks, is plotted in 
event time. The left vertical line indicates the addition date; coefficients to the left of this line are estimated 
using only pre-event data. Coefficients to the right of the right vertical line are estimated using only post-
event data. In between the vertical lines, coefficients are estimated using both pre- and post-event data. 
Panels A, B, and C show results for daily, weekly, and monthly returns, respectively. 
  
 
A. Daily Returns (N = 331) 
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B. Weekly Returns (N = 331) 
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C. Monthly Returns (N = 126) 
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